It is routine for policymakers to focus on the events of the day, and nowhere is this truer than in the Middle East, where we confront immediate crises and challenges.  It is imperative, however, that U.S. foreign policy not merely lurch from crisis to crisis, but rather approaches events in the Middle East in strategic fashion, with not only our short term objectives in mind, but our medium and long terms ones as well.  It is this strategic approach to the Middle East that I would like to discuss today.

The old Middle Eastern order is gone.  The "strategic stability" many Americans thought existed throughout the 1990s was exposed as a myth in the attacks of September 11, 2001.  We learned then that our notions of regional power balances, of bonds of friendship among governments that engender peace and stability were necessary, but by no means sufficient.  We found that American national security depends critically not only on the assiduous management of regional power, but also on the state of domestic affairs in the countries of the region, including those we consider friends.

Today we face a Middle East that remains fraught with challenges. The defeat of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes, and Iran's play for regional domination on the back of high world oil prices and a covert nuclear weapons program, creates new power equations in the region.  Some of these trends pose a long-term danger to our vital interests, as our allies and our adversaries perceive a weakening of our will in the face of uncertainty about our commitment to victory in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Make no mistake; we have core interests in the Middle East that must be protected.  Middle East energy continues to fuel our economy and our allies', and we remain extremely vulnerable to oil supply shocks.  The emergence of terrorist groups and the spread of violent radical ideology in the region and beyond threaten Americans abroad and at home.  Shipping lanes vital to global commerce cross the region and we hold the security of our chief regional allies as critical to American global engagement.

The debate over America's future engagement in Iraq and elsewhere seems increasingly disconnected from larger regional trends.  Democrats call for a rapid withdrawal of American forces with no consideration for how this would impact America's position in Afghanistan, our ability to manage the  dangerous challenge from Iran, the stability of the Gulf, and sentiment on the Arab street.  We need a new strategic framework in which to think about a region that has drawn us into three major wars in one generation, that produced many of the terrorists now waging a global war against America, and that has seen, in the past year alone, conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine and Syria.

Recent military successes in Iraq have created new opportunities for a broader strategy that would anchor Iraq in a stable region that is at peace, a region in which Iran's adventurism is firmly contained, and a region in which economic growth and political liberalization can break up the stagnant nature of many Middle East systems.  The first goal must be to create a new regional balance of power to address the rise of Iran's revolutionary, hegemonic challenge.  Elements of this new balance should be:

A failed Iraqi state would create a vacuum at the heart of the Middle East that serves as a breeding ground for terror, exports instability to its neighbors, draws them into its internal conflicts, intensifies Sunni-Shiite rivalry across the region, and enables the expansion of Iran's influence.  By contrast, if, a decade from now, Iraq has a representative government that controls all its territory, has reconstituted its potentially dynamic economy, and has emerged as a constructive regional leader, that Iraq would balance Iranian power and influence neighbors in the direction of liberal reform.  That Iraq could prove a more attractive partner to Syria than Iran, decoupling those countries from each other and the dangerous game they are playing in Lebanon and beyond.  It would also be an important partner with Turkey as Muslim democracy.  Combined with a prosperous North Africa in the west, a progressive Turkey in the north, and the stabilization of Afghanistan in the east, a stable, cohesive Iraq at the center of the Middle East would help that region chart a path of reform and moderation.

Obviously, this future will not be easy to achieve.  But it should be our goal.  Getting there requires many steps, including a major effort to involve Iraq's constructive neighbors to invest in its success.  Today, our allies the Saudis sponsor Sunni insurgents in Iraq in what they view as a proxy struggle against Iranian-backed Shiite militants for control of the country.  In so doing, they are hedging against the possibility of our failure in Iraq, rather than contributing to our success.  We must demand much more from them in our common goal to contain Iranian influence in Iraq and stabilize it as a unified state.  Egypt, a leader in the Arab world, has been missing in action in shaping the course of the new Iraq.  I understand that these regimes have concerns about the implications of a Shiite-governed democracy in their midst.  But they should understand that the prospect of a failed Iraqi state that exports terrorism, acts as a proxy for Iran, or simply inflames intra-Muslim sectarianism and radicalism, poses a direct threat to their internal security and, indeed, possibly even their survival. 

The rise of Iranian power, and America's renewed commitment to a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, give us more in common with our Arab allies.  These shared interests provide the foundation for concerted action throughout the region.  With Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Gulf states, our diplomacy must forge a coalition that links the future of a cohesive, strong Iraq to a broader strategy to prevent the extension of an Iranian sphere of influence into the heart of the Arab world.  Such a coalition requires a new American military commitment to the region, in the form of security assurances to our allies, possibly including deterrent commitments to defend them against a nuclear Iran, and in the supply of defense materiel and technologies.  Such a coalition may also require intensified American economic assistance to our allies in ways that encourage reform and economic integration with each other and the West.  As we work to stabilize Iraq and isolate Iran by strengthening friendly states along its periphery, knitting together our allies in new webs of military and economic cooperation is essential to containing Iranian influence and building the prosperous future that is the surest source of enduring security in the region.

Syria sponsors Baathist insurgents in Iraq, supports extremists in the Palestinian territories, is a conduit for manpower and materiel flowing to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and has been implicated in the assassination of leading political figures in Beirut in an effort to thwart Lebanon's democratic future.  Syria's national interests seem to run counter to such policies, as breaking out of Tehran's embrace and enjoying peaceful relations with Israel and its Arab neighbors is a far surer path to security. With our Arab allies, we must change Syria's calculus in ways that lead it to judge its regional interests differently than it has in recent years.  We can do so not through unilateral concessions or unconditional negotiation which minimize our influence but rather by presenting a new package of carrots and sticks.  Working with our European allies, this would involve substantial pressures on Damascus should it continue down its present course, including closing down its access to the international banking network, and but also leave open the prospect of closer economic and political ties should Syria pursue a path of reform, make peace with Israel, and end all support for terror.  If Syria's leadership faces no costs for its destructive policies, it will not change course.  Making clear that Syria has great incentives to join the region's constructive partners, but will face greater isolation should it continue its current policies, will aid our efforts to contain Iranian influence, check Hezbollah terror, enhance Israel's security, and stabilize Iraq. 

There can be no secure future for the region without a secure Israel living in peace with neighbors that recognize its right to exist.  U.S. policy must ensure that Israel retains its qualitative military edge within a fluctuating regional balance of power characterized by potential nuclear threats from Iran and Syria and their sponsorship of terrorism against Israeli civilians.  History shows it is Israeli weakness, not Israeli power, which destabilizes the region by tempting its neighbors to maneuver against it.  Only a strong Israel can have the confidence to strike a permanent peace with the Palestinians, a peace I will seek as President.  But such a peace can only come when Palestinians abandon terror as an instrument of policy and show a capacity for self-government.  Palestinian leaders must be willing and able to make real compromises instead of using maximalist positions to preserve power.  The international community must do more than support the status quo, and truly work to build a responsible Palestinian political order. 

Turkey is one of America's most important allies: it is a thriving and progressive Muslim democracy that provides a model for other states struggling with reform and modernization.  It is a critical member of NATO that has anchored the stability of Europe's southern flank for six decades.  It is a front-line state on Europe's border with the Middle East, giving Turkey today a role akin to West Germany during the Cold War, and it shares a border with Iraq, making it key to stability there.  As a maturing democracy, however, Washington will have to get use to voices in Ankara that do not always agree with us.  Turkey will no longer be a predictable "yes, sir" partner to the United States.  But if we work hard at our relationship, Turkey can become an indispensable cornerstone to a new Middle East.

I was disappointed that many in Congress were ready to legislate a historical judgment of the Armenian genocide whatever the cost to our relations with Turkey.  Soon after failing to defund the war in Iraq, they could gravely imperil the pivotal role Turkey plays in supplying American forces in Iraq.  Turkey is essential to stabilizing Iraq, containing Iranian power, and encouraging economic and political reform in the Arab world.  We should be strengthening our partnership, not erecting new barriers to it.  Ankara has an equal responsibility to the judgment of history with respect to the events of 1915 and to the project for a new Iraq today.  A unilateral, large-scale Turkish military intervention would destabilize northern Iraq and spur the fragmentation Turkey wishes to avoid.  At the same time, we must work seriously to rein in PKK terrorism that is a legitimate concern of Turkey.  

I would hope that all who remember 9/11 understand that failure in Afghanistan is not an option.  The world must stay engaged there as long as it takes to ensure that it does not revert to a Taliban-run terrorist safe haven.  Iran is projecting influence in both Afghanistan and Iraq in ways that challenge friendly governments in those countries.  Jihadists everywhere draw inspiration from the Taliban's survival.  American credibility, the containment of Iran, and our hope for lasting regional peace demand the Taliban's permanent defeat.  NATO's future is at stake in Afghanistan, as is the security of the 80 percent of Afghans who voted for a democratic future. 

Our military recommitment to Afghanistan must begin with greater troop contributions by NATO members and an end to the limitations that hinder their combat operations.  We should intensify our training of the Afghan national army, including inviting Afghanistan to join NATO's Partnership for Peace to institutionalize our train and equip programs.  We must expand our police training programs, provide greater resources for judicial reforms, and work with our partners to boost reconstruction.  The international community should set benchmarks for Afghan governance and hold the government to them.  We must also strike a new deal with Pakistan that ends the sanctuaries for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters on Pakistani territory.  We will not succeed in Afghanistan if our enemies enjoy safe havens, where they will also threaten Pakistan's own ability to ward off an internal Islamist challenge as well as its neighbor's.

A new Middle East must encompass reform-minded North African states whose proximity to Europe provides a pathway for rapid economic progress and integration with the West.  Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and a Libya truly committed to political reform and an end to terrorism could form the southern tier of a new, energetic Mediterranean community that could also tie Israel, Lebanon, and perhaps Egypt into common markets and institutions with Europe.  NATO could forge or expand new security ties with these countries.  A Mediterranean economic and political community could help put North African and Levant nations on a fast-track to closer engagement with the West in ways that stabilize the broader region and provide a model for their neighbors.  Europe is worried about the problems posed by immigration from this region; the best solution is creating new opportunities within those countries in education and economics.  People do not emigrate when they see a bright future for themselves at home.  While there have been the beginnings of efforts from NATO, the G8 and the EU, I believe we need to go further with a far greater sense of urgency. 

Ultimately, what we may need in the Middle East is a security structure, perhaps an institutionalized forum at which security issues can be addressed and rules of behavior hammered out.  One model to look at might be the ASEAN association of Southeast Asian countries.  Over time, such a forum might engage in arms control, develop norms for regional behavior, and exchange information on borders and transnational security threats.  Lessening regional insecurities is a critical first step in preventing a domino effect of the spread of nuclear weapons technology generated by Iran's own program.  Given the deep political fissures in the Middle East, we should not hope for too much too fast from such a structure.  Yet some basic security architecture could help stabilize a region still reeling from past conflicts.  

New roles for the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean highlight the importance of increasing our allies' stake in securing a new Middle East.  This is particularly true of our friends in Europe and India who share our interests in defeating global terrorism, ensuring security of energy supply, containing Iranian influence, and shaping a new future for a dangerous region on their own doorsteps.  We especially welcome France's new leadership in the region under President Sarkozy, as well as Tony Blair's leadership on Palestinian institution-building.  Beijing also has a critical stake in Middle Eastern energy supplies, which are vital to its continued rapid economic growth.  As China matures as a world power, we will expect it to play a role consonant with its responsibilities.  These must include delivering Khartoum on a lasting peace in Darfur, reducing arms exports to rogue regimes, and pressuring, not protecting, Tehran from international demands to end its nuclear weapons program. 

With our allies, America should lead in the creation of a Middle East free trade area tying the region's economies to each other, to the West, and to the dynamic economies of Asia.  As we have seen in Lebanon, the expansion of a middle class, nurtured by growing economies, will inevitably create pressures for political reform within autocratic states.  It is past time for all people in the region to enjoy the fruits of economic modernity that have transformed Asia, for instance, beyond recognition.

If the United States does not actively promote a new balance of power in the greater Middle East that safeguards our interests and values, others -- including Tehran, Iraqi insurgents, and the terrorists of Hezbollah and al Qaeda -- will fill the vacuum.  The grave difficulties we have encountered in Iraq are cause for reflection, but not for retreat.  Our allies and adversaries are watching closely.  They see our commitment to Iraq as a test of our broader commitment to the region and its security.  Tehran would like nothing more than unconditional, high-level negotiations with America on the future of Iraq and the region -- negotiations that would signal that a strong Iran, not a weakened America, is the power of the future which nations must increasingly accommodate -- at our expense.  Iran is working to defeat America in Iraq.  Any regional conference on Iraq's future cannot include states that want to destroy, not stabilize, the unified state of Iraq.

The future of the Middle East will be forged by America and our partners in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Afghanistan, and elsewhere -- not by tyrants in Tehran and Damascus, not by the Taliban, and not by jihadists.  While we must work to build a new security and economic structure, we cannot ignore the need for our partners to begin the process of political liberalization. Change is inevitable in the Middle East and the failure to recognize it will only lead to greater problems.  Prudently managed, reform in the Middle East will lead to greater, not less stability over the long run.

But, in the short run, we can and must prevail in Iraq to build a new regional order on the ashes of the old.  Two generations of Americans have already fought wars in Iraq; we cannot condemn a third to the same fate by letting that country become a failed state in which we must again intervene to secure our vital interests.  Anchoring Iraq in a stable, prosperous region must be the purpose of American grand strategy in the Middle East.